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Welfare chauvinism first appeared in academic literature when Norwegian and Danish political 
parties began framing immigration as a threat to the social democratic system’s survival; since 
then, it has become a cornerstone of populist ideology in Europe. A form of quasi-retrenchment, 
welfare chauvinism has been advanced in Denmark by the Danish People’s Party (DF), which 
sees immigration as a threat to the welfare state and presents chauvinism as the cure – pursuing 
one form of retrenchment to “prevent” another. DF’s electoral popularity puts the Social 
Democratic party (S) between a rock and a hard place, torn between the electoral necessities of 
accommodating chauvinism and maintaining support for the welfare state. In this paper, I argue 
that indirect retrenchment is too politically costly an option for S to pursue; instead, it will 
accommodate DF’s chauvinism by supporting direct retrenchment. I hypothesize that, via votes 
in the Danish parliament from 2004 to 2019, S has attempted to make it more difficult to obtain 
citizenship and residency rights (thus making it more difficult to obtain benefits) and make it 
easier for these rights, and thus the benefits, to be revoked. My findings broadly, but tentatively, 
support this claim. I also find that S has supported a third form of direct retrenchment: 
encouraging repatriation of foreigners to their home countries, which would entail a loss of 
benefits.  
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 Welfare chauvinism has become one of the cornerstones of European populist parties’ 
ideologies; in Denmark, it has found its political home with the Danish People’s Party (DF), the 
country’s third largest party. The term ‘welfare chauvinism’ was coined by 1990 by scholars 
studying the Danish and Norwegian populist parties seeking to restrict who was eligible to 
receive welfare benefits and promoting the exclusion of immigrants from the social system 
(Andersen and Bjorklund 1990); since then, it has become a concept applicable to almost all of 
Europe’s populist rightwing parties. The Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, France’s National 
Rally (formerly National Front), and Austria’s Freedom Party – currently a partner in the 
governmental coalition – include welfare chauvinism in their policies and platforms (Cornago 
Bonal and Zollinger 2018). For DF, policies welfare state and immigration meet at the nexus of 
“welfare chauvinism”: support of welfare only for the natives that have contributed to it, and 
opposition to welfare’s extension to anyone else (Careja et al 2017).  
 DF was one of the first welfare chauvinistic parties in Europe and its rise influenced other 
populist parties to adopt its rhetoric. Though originally critical of welfare spending, DF reacted 
to welfare cuts by mainstream parties by becoming supportive of welfare policies. It tried to 
instigate opposition to immigration and multiculturalism by framing immigrants as threats to the 
welfare state and has benefitted electorally by doing so (Schumacher ad van Kersbergen 2016). 
DF frames positively its welfare chauvinism as a patriotic duty. “We are bound by out Danish 
cultural heritage and our responsibility towards each other as people,” its manifesto reads. “For 
this reason, we wish to strengthen our country’s internal and external security.” For the party, 
protecting welfare for Danes necessitates limits on who might become Danish. “Denmark is not 
an immigrant country and never has been,” continues the manifesto. “We will not accept 
transformation to a multiethnic society” (Dansk Folkeparti 2019).  
 In analyzing welfare chauvinism, Denmark is an intriguing, and useful, case. In addition 
to being one of the first countries in which the phenomenon was observed and documented by 
academic literature, a shift towards chauvinistic exclusionism contradicts the general paradigm 
of Scandinavian welfare generosity. Van der Waal et al (2013), testing their hypothesis that the 
three worlds of welfare capitalism – liberal, conservative and social democratic (Scandinavian) – 
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were likely to derive “three worlds of welfare chauvinism” (164), found that the Scandinavian 
regime was the least likely to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare benefits. The research fit 
with existing literature. Larsen (2008) found that countries under the social democratic 
(Scandinavian) regime tended to make fewer distinctions about who was “entitled” to welfare 
and who was not, compared to countries under the other two regimes. Van Oorschot (2006) 
found that Europeans viewed immigrants as less deserving of welfare than natives but noted that 
this finding was least applicable in social-democratic countries. That Denmark has a populist 
party that espouses welfare chauvinism is not, in itself, surprising; what is more surprising, and 
worthier of study, is the proliferation of such an attitude across the political spectrum.  
 DF’s electoral success has strengthened its role as legislative, if not governmental, 
kingmaker, compounding the influence that the Danish political structure already affords it. 
Structurally, Denmark’s political system helps welfare chauvinism permeate the political arena. 
A parliamentary democracy with nine political parties represented in Parliament, it is prone to 
minority governments that almost always rely upon support from non-government parties in 
order to pass legislation. DF’s ability to become kingmaker in the legislative process compels 
mainstream parties to accommodate its anti-immigration platform to a greater degree than a more 
majoritarian system would (Careja et al 2017). The current coalition government, led by Prime 
Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen (Venstre) is comprised of Venstre (henceforth referred to as V), 
the Liberal Alliance (henceforth referred to as LA), and the Conservative People’s Party (KF). It 
relies upon support from the Danish People’s Party (DF) to pass legislation. The Social 
Democrats (S), Radical Liberals (RV), Alternative (ALT), and the Red-Green Alliance (EL) are 
in opposition.  
 Faced with electorally-popular competition from DF, Danish mainstream parties have 
been compelled to respond. Willingness to shelter refugees in Denmark is no longer a given for 
the country’s centrist parties. “They are unwanted in Denmark,” Minister of Immigration and 
Integration Inger Stojberg, of the center-right Venstre party, said of asylum seekers with criminal 
records whose applications were rejected. “And they will feel that.” Prime Minister Lars Lokke 
Rasmussen, also of Venstre, indicated Denmark’s unwillingness to allow refugees seeking 
temporary protections to enjoy the permanent benefits of residency and citizenship. “It’s not easy 
to ask families to go home,” he told listeners at a party event, “but it’s the morally right thing. 
We should not make refugees immigrants” (Sorensen 2018). Mette Fredericksen, leader of the 
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center-left Social Democrats, shared similar sentiments. “More have come than we have been 
able to effectively integrate,” she said of refugees. “We [the Social Democrats] will take control 
back” (Hamilton 2018). 
 Mette Frederiksen, leader of the Social Democrats, in an article written for the March 
2018 Financial Times, argued that Europe’s center-left parties could reestablish their electoral 
share only by heeding popular concerns. “The rise of populism is rooted in a genuine sense of 
insecurity,” she argued. “And voters cannot be blamed for reacting when the fruits of 
globalization are distributed unjustly (2018). The article focuses on the relationship “between 
markets and people” and makes no explicit reference to migration, but inherent in Frederiksen’s 
argument is admission of S’s need to adapt to changing voter preferences. One such changing 
preference involves immigration, and disillusionment with the center-left has caused S’s 
traditional supporters to defect in favor of DF. 
 In this paper, I argue that that some forms of retrenchment will be too electorally costly 
for S to pursue; instead, it will seek to retrench directly, explicitly restricting immigrants’ access 
to the social benefits provided by Denmark’s welfare system. I argue that S, via its voting in the 
Folketing (Danish Parliament), will retrench in two ways: by restricting immigrants’ access to 
the citizenship and residency rights upon which the conference of welfare benefits depends and 
by making it easier for these rights, and thus the benefits, to be revoked. I draw on the 
framework developed by Careja et al (2017) that distinguishes between indirect and direct 
welfare chauvinism. Indirect welfare chauvinism, which retrenches welfare generally but 
disproportionately affects foreigners’ access to benefits, is costlier for S than direct retrenchment, 
which explicitly excludes foreigners from receiving benefits. Accommodating welfare 
chauvinism and maintaining support for the welfare state are both electoral necessities for S – the 
former because it allows the party to retain the voters likely to defect to DF, and the latter 
because it allows the party to retain the voters likely to defect to other leftist parties if S 
compromises its support for robust welfare policies. To respond to both pressures, I argue that S 
pursues two specific courses of action. First, it will seek to limit foreigners’ access to the 
citizenship and residency rights necessary for obtaining benefits. Second, it will seek to make it 
easier to revoke those rights, thus revoking the right to access the benefits.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. First, I lay out the theoretical framework of welfare 
chauvinism and of my argument. Second, I review the literature on welfare chauvinism, with 
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emphasis on how it relates to the Danish case, and outline what this paper contributes to the 
topic’s study. Third, I will provide an overview of the “state of play” in Denmark’s political 
arena, providing three case studies of unsuccessful proposals that attest to political parties’ 
voting behavior on proposed welfare retrenchment. Finally, I present and discuss my results and 
evaluate my hypothesis. Tables outlining each vote analyzed, with brief content summaries, can 
be found in the appendix.  
   
Theoretical Framework 
 Direct and indirect chauvinism are both forms of welfare retrenchment and are 
ostensibly, and sometimes expressly, aimed at limiting foreigners’ access to welfare benefits. 
Different forms of chauvinism, however, have implications that a political party – especially a 
center-left party that seeks and claims to defend the welfare state – must consider. Direct 
chauvinism is levied directly and exclusively against immigrants and involves the group being 
explicitly excluded from benefits. Indirect chauvinism has a broad target group, but 
disproportionately affects immigrants, and occurs when welfare is retrenched and when welfare 
is made conditional upon recipients’ adherence to certain criteria. Indirect chauvinism thus 
retrenches welfare in general, though foreigners are often the most affected; for example, 
because foreigners tend to have more children than natives, a policy reducing child benefit would 
disproportionately impact immigrants as a group. Likewise, a policy making child benefit 
conditional upon parents’ working hours would negatively impact immigrants, who tend to 
participate in the labor force at a lower rate than natives (Careja et al 2017).  
 When welfare chauvinist parties increase their electoral share, mainstream parties may 
respond in three ways. They can accommodate welfare chauvinism by adopting the policies and 
language of the populist parties, thereby including welfare chauvinism in their own ideologies 
and policies. They can attack welfare chauvinism by directly opposing it and supporting policies 
that recognize equality, rejecting exclusionism in favor of universalism. They can ignore welfare 
chauvinism and carry on with existing platforms, not accounting for the welfare chauvinist 
parties. In general, the decision to respond via accommodation or attack is influenced by 
mainstream parties’ expectation that welfare chauvinism will have electoral consequences. 
Mainstream right-wing parties tend to become more supportive of welfare and less supportive of 
multiculturalism when populist parties exhibit welfare chauvinism, while mainstream left-wing 
Carstens 6 
 
parties tend to maintain their already high support for welfare and become less supportive of 
multiculturalism. This was evidenced after 1998, when DF’s participation in national elections 
caused a shift against multiculturalism and towards welfare support among all Danish political 
parties except RV, thus resulting in generally, albeit limited, accommodating responses 
(Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). 
          Although Danish mainstream political parties accommodate DF’s welfare chauvinism out 
of political and electoral necessity, they approach welfare and retrenchment in different ways. In 
Denmark, support for the welfare state exists across all parties; no party seeks to radically 
retrench the welfare state, although stance on retrenchment tends to be partisan. Leftist parties 
tend to advocate generous and universal welfare systems and expanding immigrants’ rights so 
that they may partake of welfare benefits. Rightwing parties in welfare states, on the other hand, 
are likely to support closing the welfare system to foreigners (Koopmans et al 2012). Welfare 
retrenchment, especially in countries like Denmark where the welfare state is popular, is a 
politically unpopular measure. Parties that retrench thus must engage in blame avoidance to 
mediate the electoral impacts of retrenchment. One blame avoidance strategy involves grouping 
welfare recipients into “deserving” and “undeserving” categories and framing retrenchment as a 
necessary measure to reduce the burden that the “undeserving” place on the system (Ermark ad 
Schoop 2017). The Danish case reflects these blame avoidance strategies; while the Danish 
People’s Party perceives a threat to the welfare state from all foreigners’ access to its benefits, 
other Danish parties qualify their welfare chauvinism. The Social Democrats have emphasized 
immigrants’ integration potential, introducing a social element to the discussion surrounding who 
deserves what in Denmark. Venstre’s concerns are more market-related, and the party seeks to 
reserve benefits for workers whose contributions to the system will, at least in the long term, 
balance out the benefits they receive. Two types of welfare chauvinism are thus distinguishable: 
the neoliberal, market-based chauvinism, and the socially-focused, solidarity-based chauvinism, 
employed by the right and left wing respectively (Jorgensen and Thomsen 2016: 331). 
            That populist parties promote welfare chauvinism, and that mainstream parties 
accommodate it for electoral reasons, has been established. What is less clear is how parties 
retrench when anti-immigrant chauvinism and welfare state maintenance (or expansion) when 
both concerns are equally electorally pressing. Indirect welfare chauvinism retrenches the 
welfare state for all of its users, including natives; and is likely to entail electoral consequences 
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for a center-left party like S that is keen to be seen as a defender – and even expander – of the 
welfare state. My research sheds light on how welfare-supportive political parties respond to 
welfare chauvinism and fills an important gap in the existing literature. 
 
Literature Review: the Political Salience of Migration 
              As Freeman (1986) notes, national welfare systems are necessarily closed systems; that 
is, they provide benefits to members (citizens) and exclude non-members (non-citizens) from 
those benefits. In order for a welfare state to function, citizens must share a sense of solidarity; 
that is, they must recognize their common membership and identify this membership as the 
necessary condition for sharing social benefits. By its nature, this process implies the existence 
of non-members, who are excluded from sharing in the welfare state’s benefits. The fact that 
welfare states are generally ethnically homogeneous and correspond to nation-state boundaries 
makes it difficult for foreigners to integrate and be seen as members on equal footing with 
natives (Grodem 2016). This exacerbates the challenge that migration poses to welfare states as 
it erodes the social consensus – the solidarity condition – upon which welfare states depend.  
Welfare chauvinism is impacted both by these social concerns and by more material fiscal 
concerns. Hansen, Schultz-Nielsen and Tranaes (2015) find that the fiscal impact of migration to 
Denmark is significantly impacted by the country from which immigrants come. While 
migration from Western countries has a significant positive fiscal impact, the fiscal impact of 
migration from non-Western countries is heavily negative. While Western migration generates a 
surplus, non-Western migration causes a deficit. This can be explained by non-Western 
immigrants’ relationship with the labor market: they tend to participate in the workforce less and 
retire early. Denmark’s ability to strengthen the welfare state’s fiscal foundations through 
immigration is thus dependent upon the type of immigration Denmark receives.  
                 Whether immigration is evaluated as a net positive or net negative, socially or 
financially, for Denmark does not necessarily determine whether the Danish welfare state 
includes or excludes immigrants. Two hypotheses attempt to explain the relationship between 
welfare availability and immigration. The dualization hypothesis holds that welfare generosity 
correlates negatively with foreigners’ access to welfare benefits for two reasons. First, generous 
welfare systems may serve as “magnets” for migration as foreigners are attracted to the promise 
of social benefits. The higher the number of foreigners seeking benefits in a welfare state, the 
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higher the budgetary strain. Second, immigration threatens societal ethnic homogeneity, which 
undermines the social trust upon which the success of welfare states relies. In other words, while 
the average Dane is likely to support welfare benefits for other, more disadvantaged Danes, s/he 
is far less likely to support such benefits for foreigners, with whom s/he lacks “trust.” The 
generosity hypothesis holds that welfare generosity correlates positively with foreigners’ access 
to benefits. The decommodifying policies inherent to the structure of most generous welfare 
states decrease economic competition and protect workers’ rights, thereby reducing the 
possibilities of foreigners being seen as a threat. Furthermore, generous welfare systems tend to 
adhere to egalitarian principles and non-discriminatory ideologies that mediate the tendency to 
identify foreigners as “the other.” Such principles are applied practically through the non-
establishment of screening mechanisms, which would identify certain people as “the other” via 
legal means (checking of ID documents, implementation of mandatory reporting/notification 
obligations, etc.). Romer (2017) finds that, in general, the generosity hypothesis is more 
parsimonious, though she notes that Denmark’s restriction of immigrants’ rights is a minor 
exception to the norm.  
 Jorgensen and Meret (2012) argue that Danish politics have afforded relatively little 
attention to irregular migration because it is a “marginal phenomenon.” The applicability of this 
finding post-2012 seems to be contradicted by the rhetoric and policies from Denmark’s major 
political parties, but the authors’ identification of the mechanisms Denmark uses to control 
migration remains salient. Danish solutions to irregular migration center upon control 
mechanisms aimed at restricting migrants’ access to the country and return policies aimed at 
repatriating the migrants that have gained entry. In addition to implementing measures that 
directly inhibit asylum seekers’ access to asylum, Denmark has implemented policies of 
“indirect deterrence” aimed at persuading foreigners not to enter the country in the first place. 
This is usually accomplished by implementing excessive conditionality for access to citizenship, 
residence rights and social benefits, thereby reducing the likelihood of foreigners qualifying to 
receive them (Esmark and Schoop 2017). Some of these measures correspond to direct 
retrenchment; these are the types of measures I predict will be supported legislatively by S.  
 
Danish Welfare: In the Trenches? 
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 Three attempted proposals constituting welfare retrenchment warrant attention as they 
indicate S and DF’s hierarchy of preferences on welfare retrenchment. The first proposal 
involved tax reform, analysis of which is useful for two reasons. First, tax cuts are a form of 
welfare retrenchment that governments perceive as less electorally risky than more blatant forms 
of welfare retrenchment. This implies that parties which propose and support tax reform are 
relatively insulated from electoral consequence for doing so – or, at least, they perceive that they 
are. Second, tax cuts tend to have a partisan dimension in Denmark. While leftwing governments 
tend to create more forms of taxation to provide the welfare state with additional sources of 
income, rightwing governments tend to retrench the welfare state by decreasing its income flow 
via tax cuts (Klitgard and Elmelund-Praestaeker 2014). Therefore, if S’s rightwing shift 
influenced it to support general welfare retrenchment to a greater degree than it did in the past, it 
is likely that this would be evidenced in its stance on tax reform. In 2018, V concluded an 
agreement with DF to increase restrictions on the residence conditions under which citizens 
would receive unemployment benefits. The initial version of the proposal required people to 
have lived in Denmark for 7 of the past 8 years, but trade unions and left-wing parties, including 
S, expressed concern over the proposal, noting that it would exclude Danish citizens who had 
worked abroad from receiving benefits (Gadd 2018). In the final version of the bill, exceptions 
were made for Danish citizens working for companies overseas and workers who had lived in 
EU countries. Residence requirements were changed to 7 out of the past 12 years, but despite the 
changes, S, EL, ALT, RV and SF opposed the bill, which ultimately passed with support from 
DF, V, LA and KF (Folketinget 2019). It was estimated that that 80% of individuals affected by 
this proposal will be from non-EU countries, which employment minister Troels Lund Poulsen 
(V) said “[has] always been the intention” (Gadd 2018). Despite the bill’s potential adverse 
consequences for Danish workers, DF supported the bill. Its support can be explained in part by 
the bill’s consequences for immigrants and in part by the party’s hostility to foreign labor. While 
it is proven electorally popular for S to accommodate welfare chauvinism by supporting policy 
that excludes foreigners, S did not support the proposal. This indicates that its support for the 
welfare state in general has not changed, though its stance towards extension of welfare benefits 
to foreigners has. The consequences for Danish workers outweighed the consequences for 
foreigners in S’s calculation, but not in DF’s calculation.  
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 The second proposal centered upon the long-contested issue of tax cuts. In early 2018, the 
V-led government scrapped plans to cut taxes when it failed to garner enough support from other 
parties. S refused to support the proposal on the basis of its “lack of welfare” (The Local 
Denmark 2017). DF predicated its support for the proposal on the government’s willingness to 
revoke refugees’ residence rights; V would not accommodate the request and DF refused to 
support the bill. The government plans to introduce new tax cuts targeting low-earning workers, 
which DF has promised to support (Levring and Rigillo 2018). S responded by introducing its 
own tax plan, which it promises to implement if it forms a government after 2019 general 
elections. The plan includes, among other things, caps on salaries for executives, extension of 
employee bonuses, a doubling of inheritance tax, and a 10 percent increase on the tax ceiling for 
capital gains (Levring 2018). Despite the potential negative implications for Danes, including the 
blue-collar workers that comprise much of DF’s voting base, the party was prepared to support 
the proposal if the consequences for foreigners were sufficiently negative. S not only opposed 
the proposal on the basis of these potential adverse effects, but released its own proposal in an 
attempt to attest to its welfare “credentials.” As with the retirement proposal, for S, the potential 
consequences for Danes outweighed the political utility of accommodating welfare chauvinism. 
For DF, the opposite was true. 
 The third proposal related to Denmark’s retirement age. In 2011, the V government, with 
support from DF and RV, passed a bill reforming the country’s early retirement scheme, a 
reform that would eventually raise the retirement age to 69. S and SF, supported by some labor 
unions, opposed the effort, arguing that it would have negative consequences for blue-collar 
workers whose work was mentally and physically exhausting. Despite the passing of the bill at 
the time, the part of the agreement that intermittently raised the retirement age to 67.5 was 
shelved in 2017 due to opposition from DF and S. The proposal was part of a market-related 
reform, aimed at combatting the lack of available workers in Denmark by increasing the number 
of years Danes spent working. S’s behavior is indicative of its traditional opposition to such 
reforms. DF’s support for the bill indicates the party’s lack of consistency on welfare 
retrenchment and underscores the difficulty in predicting DF’s preferences on such legislation. 
Voting behavior on this issue would appear to fit with existing literature. While support for the 
Danish welfare state remains high across political parties, S and the center-right parties diverge 
significantly. S, in general, favors expansion of the welfare state, advocating higher taxation to 
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finance higher public spending. While V and its bloc do not consistently advocate retrenchment, 
it is significantly less likely to seek expansion of the welfare state and is more likely to propose 
market-focused reforms. Focus on such reforms, however, declined from 1970-2003, due partly 
to the popularity of the welfare state among citizens and the unpopularity of retrenchment among 
political parties. S tends to oppose welfare retrenchment and market-focused reforms regardless 
of whether it is part of the government or opposition (Nygard 2006). 
 Despite its rightward shift, it is not surprising that S refuses to support welfare 
retrenchment. Arndt (2013) demonstrates that the S-led government of 1993-2001 was 
electorally punished by voters for its role in welfare retrenchment. The party’s traditional 
working-class voter base, disillusioned with S because of its liberal immigration policy and its 
backsliding on social democracy as evidenced by its willingness to retrench, moved increasingly 
to the Danish People’s Party. This finding fits within a larger paradigm of voter reaction to 
welfare retrenchment. Schumacher et al (2012) found that, in general, welfare retrenchment leads 
to negative electoral consequences for the parties that implement and support it. The 
consequences are especially severe for center-left, welfare-supportive parties, as voters perceive 
a sort of betrayal that decreases their willingness to vote for the party. Parties that are perceived 
to be more welfare-critical are electorally punished as a result of their role in retrenchment, but 
not to the degree that welfare-supportive parties are. Thus, the electoral consequences of welfare 
retrenchment are different for political parties based on voters’ perceptions of their stances on 
welfare, and leftist governments suffer the most.  
 Currently, S has electoral incentives for accommodating welfare chauvinism. Should it 
receive a mandate to form a government after the 2019 general election, it will have political 
incentives as well. Welfare retrenchment may well help S leave the opposition, form a 
government and pass laws that fit with its welfare expansionary platform, but what S is not able 
to do is accommodate DF’s indirect welfare chauvinism. If S acquiesces to such retrenchment of 
the welfare state – even if the ostensible target is Denmark’s foreign-born population – its 
credentials as the political establishment’s foremost defender of the welfare state will come into 
question at precisely the moment it is arguably being redeemed. As Arndt (2013) established, 
voters are willing to electorally punish S for instigating welfare retrenchment, even if doing so 
results in the election of a party that also favors retrenchment. This was evidence in the 2011 
election, when voters spurned the center-left administration of Helle Thorning-Schmidt due to 
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the indirect retrenchment it implemented. While some of its retrenchment had a clear bias against 
foreigners, retrenchment rolled back benefits for citizens in general, which proved unpopular 
(Jorgensen and Thomsen 2016: 331). 
Center-Left and Far-Right: Conflict or Convergence?  
 As the ideological differences between Denmark’s leftwing parties have increased, the 
potential for the bloc to work together has decreased. Traditionally, before the Parliament’s 
summer break, Denmark’s red (left-wing) bloc and blue (right-wing) bloc release statements 
noting shared goals and evaluating the general political arena. In 2018, the practice clearly 
showed disunity among the red bloc, as the RV, ALT and SF refused to endorse the statement 
written by S. Instead, they released their own, criticizing Frederiksen’s party for its role in 
passing anti-immigrant legislation (Barrett 2018a). Less than a week later, Frederiksen 
announced that, should S win Denmark’s next general election, it would seek to form a minority 
government without support from alternative leftist parties, breaking a 25-year cooperation 
agreement among parties in the blue bloc. The reason, Frederiksen said, is the “blurring of lines” 
between the mainstream left and right-wing, especially on immigration, an issue on which the 
positions of S and SF are no longer compatible (Barret 2018b).  
 Nedergaard (2017) argues that three factors explain the Social Democratic leadership’s 
turn towards accommodation of welfare chauvinism. The first is informed by the Scandinavian 
welfare state’s “closed” condition as articulated by Freeman. S, which perceives and promotes 
itself as the welfare state’s foremost political defender, has come to see large-scale migration 
from developing nations as a threat to the existence of the welfare state. In this view, restriction 
of welfare for immigrants is necessary to prevent welfare retrenchment on a larger scale. The 
second involves the party’s reckoning with its past. In the 1980s, S-led governments liberalized 
migration policy, which ultimately became unpopular with electorates. This second factor 
follows from the first, as S could no longer viably tout its pro-welfare credentials as voters 
blamed it for allowing the large-scale migration that necessarily leads to welfare retrenchment. 
The third factor is the loss of S’s traditional voting base, as working-class voters have 
increasingly defected to DF and V. S has thus been deprived of a reliable voting base; most  
likely unable to win support of high-earners because of its opposition to tax cuts and support of 
high public spending, S must win back its traditional working-class base to survive. The shift to 
the right led by Frederiksen, has spared S from the electorally bleak fate that has befallen much 
Carstens 13 
 
of Europe’s center left, but such a departure from the party’s traditional ideology will necessitate 
a sharp break from its liberal allies. Whether this is a choice S is willing to make will only be 
made clear in the next election.  
 Ideologically, S and DF intersect in a way uncharacteristic of the center-left and far-right. 
Their parties’ platforms converge in four critical areas: concern over the rollback of workers’ 
rights; income inequality; unregulated neoliberal policies resulting from globalization; and the 
challenges of integrating refugees and migrants into a closed system. Both would, on the surface, 
appear to oppose welfare retrenchment for natives. Both oppose lowering taxes on top earners 
and raising the age at which citizens may retire and qualify for state pensions; both support 
higher public spending to support the welfare state. A key difference between S and DF is the 
scope of their respective program’s focus. S, despite its opposition to neoliberal market policies, 
acknowledges the integration of the Danish economy into the European and global economies, 
and thus its program attacks globalism’s adverse effects without opposing globalism per se. DF, 
on the other hand, opposes globalism on principle (Helbak and Krogsbaek 2018). Though the 
difference in scope affects the parties’ abilities to implement coherent policy – a task S is more 
likely to accomplish than DF – it does not translate into a fundamentally different stance on the 
welfare state; indeed, on paper, the two parties’ platforms seem compatible.  
 S's shift to the right has thus far failed to deliver electoral consequences. An opinion poll 
in August gauged S’s popularity to be 26% - the same as its popularity immediately before the 
2015 general election (The Local Denmark 2018). Therefore, despite the change in the party’s 
direction has not translated to a change in support. With general elections in June 2019, however, 
S finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, if it continues accommodating 
DF’s welfare chauvinism, it risks alienating its liberal voters and its traditional allies. This is 
likely to be a particularly difficult option if DF promotes indirect retrenchment, which would 
impact native Danes as well as immigrants. Accommodating welfare chauvinism in such 
conditions would almost certainly lead to electoral consequences. On the other hand, if S reverts 
to its previous immigration and multiculturalism policies, it risks being punished electorally.  
 
Methodology 
 I hypothesize that electoral pressures will compel S to accommodate welfare chauvinism, 
but that it will not retrench directly because doing so is electorally costly; instead, it will retrench 
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directly. To evaluate this claim, I analyze bills voted upon by the Danish parliament (Folketing) 
that concern immigrants’ access to Danish citizenship, residency and/or benefits proposed by the 
competent ministries1 since the inauguration of the Anders Fogh Rasmussen cabinet in 2004, as 
these are the earliest legislative records kept systematically by the Folketing online. This analysis 
includes only those bills that were voted on by the Folketing; it does not include bills in 
committee at the time of writing or bills that were shelved in committee. More regulatory bills – 
for example, those that transpose European directives into national law – and those that impose 
minor structural changes on administrations and agencies (i.e. those that change rules for 
appointing members of immigration advisory boards) are not included in this analysis. Laws 
relating to temporary tourist visas, extraordinary acts granting citizenship to persons of domestic 
importance, and other bills irrelevant to the purpose of this paper are not analyzed. The full list 
of analyzed bills, with summaries of content, can be found in the appendix. Comprehensive 
overviews of the bills may be found, in Danish, on the Folketing website.  
 Each bill is assigned either a plus (+) or minus (-) sign indicating its implications for 
foreigners in Denmark. Those bills marked with a plus (+) have made it easier for foreigners to 
gain access to the country’s social benefits via either eased access to residency and citizenship or 
eased direct access to benefits. Those bills marked with a minus (-) have made it more difficult 
for foreigners to gain access to these benefits via either restricted access to residency and 
citizenship or restricted direct access to benefits. This is not a subjective evaluation of whether 
the bills are “good” or “bad”; it indicates only whether they have positive or negative 
implications for foreigners’ access to social benefits in Denmark. 
 I identify five forms of welfare retrenchment implemented by Danish ministries in the 
area of immigrant rights and affairs: Revocation, Financial Obligation, Denial of Access, Social 
                                                          
1 The Danish ministry which handles refugee, immigration and integration affairs has been abolished, reestablished 
and renamed multiple times, although for the period analyzed here it has always existed in some form. The Ministry 
for Refugees, Immigrants and Integration, established in the cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V) existed until 
2011, when it was abolished by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S). Competences for immigration policy 
were transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration from 2011-2013; the 
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration from 2013-2014; and the Ministry of 
Justice and the Ministry for Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations until the end of the government’s 
mandate. In 2015 a different government led by Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V) was elected. From 28 June 2015 to 28 
November 2016, the government was comprised only of ministers from V. During this period, the ministry that 
introduced legislation on immigration affairs was the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing. Following 
the reestablishment of a three-party (V, LA, KF) cabinet in late 2016, the ministry that introduced relevant 
legislation was the Ministry of Immigration and Integration, under the same minister. Competence for housing 
policy was relocated to another ministry. 
Carstens 15 
 
Obligation, and Repatriation Incentive. Revocation refers to authorities’ rights to deprive an 
individual of rights to residence, citizenship, and/or benefit that the citizen would have enjoyed 
prior to the passing of the law. Financial obligation refers to the increase in or introduction of 
cost for programs that previously were free or less costly; in other words, the transfer of burden 
of payment from state to individual user. Denial of Access characterizes a law that aims to 
restrict the number of people able to access, or exclude members of a certain group from 
accessing, residence, citizenship and/or. Social obligation refers to the obligation of an individual 
seeking residence, citizenship and/or benefits to prove adherence to a socially-constructed 
criteria, i.e. the obligation of a refugee to prove respect for “Danish values” or attest to their 
social integration potential. Social obligation may be construed as a form of denial of access, but 
because a distinction must be made between normative laws and restrictions (i.e. increase in 
waiting periods) and socially-constructed obligations, two categories must be used. Repatriation 
incentive, while not a way to deny foreigners access to social benefits per se, nonetheless aims to 
decrease access of foreigners to residence and/or citizenship. For the purposes of this research, it 
is evaluated as +/- (neutral), as it neither directly restricts nor expands foreigners’ access to social 
rights in Denmark. 
 
Results 
These results are derived from the larger dataset found in the appendix. The left column indicates 
the type of restriction in the bill. The middle column denotes the number of bills that included 
this type of restriction and the right column indicates how S voted. The number of markings in 
the right column do not always correspond to the number in the middle column because some 
votes included more than one type of restriction. The number of restrictions do not correspond to 
the total number both for this reason and because some of the bills voted upon were positive and 
thus included no restrictions.  
2018-2019 
Restriction Type # S vote 
Revocation 2 +, + 
Financial Obligation 2 +, / 
Denial of Access 3 +, +, + 
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Revocation 3 +, +, + 
Financial Obligation 1 + 
Denial of Access 12 / (2), - (2), + (8) 
Social Obligation 
  
Repatriation Incentive 1 + 
 
2016-2017 
Revocation 1 + 
Financial Obligation 
  
Denial of Access 9 + (8), - (1) 
Social Obligation 
  







Denial of Access 7 -, + (7) 









Denial of Access 1 - 




2014-2015: Government of Thorning-Schmidt 





















Repatriation Incentive 2 +, + 
 
2012-2013 
Revocation 1 + 
Financial Obligation 
  




Repatriation Incentive 1 + 
 
2011-2012 
All positive laws; no restrictions. 
 
2010-2011: no laws. 
 
2010-2011: Government of Lokke Rasmussen 
Revocation 2 +, - 
Financial Obligation 1 - 
Denial of Access 2 -, - 
Social Obligation 
  
Repatriation Incentive 1 - 
 
2009-2010 





Denial of Access 1 + 
Social Obligation 2 +, + 
Repatriation Incentive 1 + 
 
2008-2009 
Revocation 1 + 
Financial Obligation 
  















Denial of Access 1 + 
Social Obligation 1 - 
Repatriation Incentive 1 - 
 
2005-2006 
Revocation 1 + 
Financial Obligation 
  
Denial of Access 1 + 









Denial of Access 1 + 






             The increase in the number of immigration-related bills voted upon by the Folketing 
corresponds with the increase of asylum seekers received by Denmark during the migration 
“crisis” in Europe. Obviously, an increase in the total number of bills increases the likelihood of 
S to vote a certain way, thus it is not useful to calculate the percentage change of S’s support, 
opposition and abstentions. The use of percentages to analyze S’s voting behavior during each 
time period is not unproblematic due to the small number of bills, but while the percentages 
should not be considered in isolation, they are useful for portraying S’s voting behavior. In the 
2018-2019 period, S abstained on 2 of 8 bills with restrictions (25%) and opposed none (0%). In 
the 2017-2018 period, S abstained on 2 of 17 bills (12%) and opposed 2 (12%). In the 2016-2017 
period, S opposed 1 of 11 bills (9%). In the 2015-2016 period, S opposed 2 of 10 bills (20%). In 
the 2014-2015 period for which a V-led government was in power, S opposed both bills (100%). 
In the 2014-2015 period for which an S-led government was in power, S opposed the only bill 
(100%). In the 2013-2014 and 2012-2013 periods, S opposed no bills. In the 2010-2011 period, S 
opposed 5 of 6 bills (83%). In the 2009-2010 period, S opposed 1 of 5 bills (20%). In the 2008-
2009 period, S opposed 1 of 3 bills (33%). In the 2006-2007 period, S opposed 2 of 3 bills 
(67%). In the 2005-2006 period, S opposed 1 (25%) and abstained on 1 (25%) of 4 bills. In the 
2004-2005 period, S opposed no bills (0%). 
            As noted, the small number of relevant bills voted upon by the Folketing makes drawing 
conclusions difficult. However, S’s relatively permissive attitude towards restrictive bills during 
the V-led government’s tenure (2015-2019) contrasts with its voting behavior during the S-led 
government’s tenure (2011-2015), indicating that the loss of the election did indeed result in 
“lessons learned.” The likelihood of S voting with DF was also significantly higher during the V-
led government’s tenure than during the S-led government’s tenure, as the tables in the appendix 
show. Perhaps a more useful indicator of changes in S’s voting behavior can be found by 
analyzing what parties S tended to vote with during its tenure as opposition under the first and 
second Rasmussen cabinets. In the 2018-2019 period, S voted with DF on 5 out of 6 bills and 
only voted with its former coalition partner RV on 3. In 2017-2018, it voted with DF 10 times 
and voted with RV 8 times. In 2016-2017, it voted with DF 9 times, including one unusual 
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instance in which both sides opposed the government, and voted with RV 5 times. In 2015-2016, 
it voted with DF 9 times and with RV 3 times.  
 
Conclusion 
 The findings above reflect tentative support for my hypothesis. Voting records also 
identify another form of direct retrenchment supported by S: encouragement of repatriation of 
foreigners to their home countries. S has accommodated DF’s welfare chauvinism by supporting 
direct retrenchment in three ways: by making it more difficult for foreigners to acquire the 
conditions under which they may claim and receive welfare benefits in two ways: a) by making it 
more difficult for foreigners to meet the residency and citizenship requirements necessary for 
access to benefits and b) by expanding the conditions under which residency and citizenship 
rights may be revoked and c) by encouraging repatriation. Though repatriation is more voluntary 
than exclusion and expulsion, it indicates a desire on the part of the parties that vote for it to 
extend fewer benefits to fewer foreigners, and thus it constitutes a form of direct retrenchment. 
Based on these findings, I anticipate that, in the future, S will continue to retrench directly 
because indirect retrenchment almost certainly entails negative electoral consequences. An 
upcoming general election, due to be held in June 2019, increases S’s prerogatives for pursuing 
welfare chauvinism accommodation and welfare state support. 
            This paper analyzed only the bills voted upon by the Folketing that met certain 
specifications; a more systemic, robust analysis would account for bills that were proposed but 
not voted on. This would allow for a more thorough analysis of how S and DF react to proposals 
ostensibly aimed at reducing access to benefits for foreigners but effectively infringe upon native 
Danes’ access to those benefits. It was beyond the scope of this project to analyze such 
legislation here, but doing so would provide a clearer picture of the two parties’ relationship with 
migration and welfare policy. Because of the small number of bills analyzed, the study suffers 
from overdetermination; while the findings tentatively support the hypothesis, the hypothesis 










2018-2019: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF). 
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V) 
Law Content +/- Retrenchment 
Type 
Status Support Opposition Abstentions 
L166 Extension of British 
citizens’ rights in event of 
no-deal Brexit 





L152 Legalize expulsion of 
foreigners who violate 
laws on criminalization of 
mental violence; Restrict 
access to residence 
permits for foreigners 





Confirmed S, DF, V, 
RV, SF, 
KF 
EL, ALT / 
L140 Introduction of cap for 
family reunifications; 
further penalty for 
violation of residency and 
entry laws; increased 
leeway for authorities to 
revoke refugees’ residence 
permits; rephrasing so that 
refugees’ residence 












L133 Compel users of au pair 














Raise naturalization fee; 
allow Minister to set 
conditions for citizenship 
ceremonies, upon which 
conference of citizenship 
is conditional, including 









Confirmed DF, V, 
LA, KF 
EL, ALT, 
RV, SF  
S 
L55B Restriction of conditions 













2017-2018: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).  
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V) 
L239 Increase residence 
requirement and 
introduce employment 
requirement to earn right 
to education and cash 
benefits 
- Denial of 
Access 
Confirmed DF, V, 
LA, KF 
AL, ALT, 
RV, SF  
S 
L231 Make spousal 
reunification conditional 
upon likelihood of 
spouse’s successful 
integration; connection 




of residence requirement 
for individuals seeking 
reunification of spouse, 
including limits on where 
residence can be located 
- Denial of 
Access 





L225 Introduction of payment 
obligations for education 
for students, foreign 
workers, and EU citizens 
- Financial 
Obligation 





L222 Effective grant of 
citizenship to 1953 adults 
and 472 children together 
with parents 





L215 Abolition of au pair 
scheme on grounds that it 
facilitates “wage 
dumping” and undeclared 
work 
- Denial of 
Access 
Rejected DF, EL, 
SF 




L197 Continue provisions to 
establish temporary 
residences for refugees; 
increase police power to 
detain refugees to verify 
identity 
- Denial of 
Access 





L196 Obliges authorities to 












structural factors for 
repatriation; provide 
incentives for repatriation 
L189 Changes to wage 
requirement for 
foreigners employed in 
certain types of work, to 
ensure that such 
employment does not 
affect the wages of 
Danish workers 
- Denial of 
Access 




L180 Ease ability of authorities 
to expel foreigners 
deemed no longer in need 
of protection 





L156 Introduction of shorter 
entry bans so that more 
individuals may be 
denied entry; establish 
framework for expulsion 
of foreigners charged 
with crimes 




Confirmed S, DF, V, 
LA, RV, 
SF, KF 
EL, ALT  
L145
A 
Tightening of regulations 
guiding asylum seekers’ 
access to housing and 
labor market 
- Denial of 
Access 














L140  Ease access to residence 
permits for foreigners 









L120 Reduction of integration 
allowance to incentivize 
job-seeking 
- Denial of 
Access 
Confirmed DF, V, 
LA, KF 
EL, ALT, 
RV, SF  
S 
L97 Simplify rules for 
distribution of refugees 
among municipalities; 
restricts right of refugees 
to be rehoused if they 
move away from 
- Denial of 
Access 








municipality to which 
they were assigned 
L96 Increase right of 
authorities to refuse to 
issue travel documents to 
foreigners if suspicion of 
sale/abuse of travel 
documents 
- Denial of 
Access 
Confirmed S, DF, V, 
LA, RV, 
SF, KF 
EL, ALT / 
L95B Removal of “special, 
easy” access to judicial 
trial in family 
reunification cases 
involving children 
- Denial of 
Access 





L94 Ease access to labor 
market and residence 
permits for foreigners 
with “innovative business 
ideas” 
+ / Confirmed S, V, LA, 
ALT, RV, 
SF, KF 
DF, EL / 
L80 Set quota of 500 for 
refugees issued with 
residence permit annually 
- Denial of 
Access 






L46 Restrict access to 
permanent residence 
permit for foreigners who 
have “opposed the 
clarification of their 
identity” 






2016-2017: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, LA, KF).  
Ministry of Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V) 
L204 Denial of education for 





- Denial of 
Access 






L188 Increase use of 
biometrics/fingerprints 
and personal photographs 
to verify asylum seekers’ 
identities 
- Denial of 
Access 





L175 Facilitate newcomers’ 
access to labor market 







L174 Increase incentives for 










L163 Ease family reunification 
for some professionals 
affected by the repeal of 
the 26-year rule 






L162 Repeal of 26-year rule for 
family reunification 






L161 Increase in minimum 
salary necessary for 
foreign workers to legally 
stay in Denmark 
- Denial of 
Access 




L154 Increase restrictions for 
obtaining residence 
permit, including increase 
in residence requirement 
and requirement for self-
sufficiency 
- Denial of 
Access 





L153 Enactment of “emergency 
brake” allowing Denmark 
to reject asylum seekers 
at border in crisis 
situations 
- Denial of 
Access 









- Denial of 
Access 






L119 Restrict authorities’ 
abilities to revoke student 
residence permits in case 
of illegal work 






2016-2017: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V).  
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.  
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V) 









L51 Increased monitoring of 
foreigners with criminal 
- Denial of 
Access 








penalties for violating 
notification obligation 
L50 Introduction of obligation 
of religious figures to 
commit to compliance 
with Danish law and take 
course on Danish law and 
order prior to being 
granted residence permit 
- Denial of 
Access 





L49 Compels authorities to 
expel criminal foreigners 
unless doing so expressly 
contradicts Denmark’s 
international obligations 
(abolition of changes 
made by former 
government) 






L48 Introduction of sanctions 
list naming individuals to 
be banned entry to 
Denmark on basis of 
public order 
- Denial of 
Access 






2015-2016: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V).  
Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing.  
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V) 
L191
A 
Abolition of 2 year 
deadline for family 
reunification in cases 
involving children 
- Denial of 
Access 







Allow cash-benefit and 
educational aid recipients 
who become integration 
benefit recipients to 
retain already-earned 
benefits 





L188 Provide benefits to 
companies that provide 
foreigners and refugees 
with practical training 
and education 






L169 Cancellation of green 
card scheme on basis of 
“wage-dumping” 
- Denial of 
Access 








L168 Increase foreign workers’ 
minimum income 
requirement for residence 
under amounts scheme 
- Denial of 
Access 






L111 Extension of integration 
benefit to create 
“incentive to work” and 
“be integrated” 
- Denial of 
Access/Social 
Obligation  






L87  Postpone family 
reunification for persons 
with temporary 
protection; abolition of 
“easy” access to 
permanent residence 
permit for refugees; 
reduction of cash benefit 
for asylum seekers; allow 
authorities to search 
refugees’ belongings and 
confiscate items to help 
state cover expenses for 
these refugees; condition 
selection of quota 
refugees on those 
refugees’ potential for 
integration; increase 
ability of authorities to 
withdraw residence 
permits of refugees who 















L62 Allow authorities to stop 
transportation services 
between Denmark and 
other countries in 
extraordinary cases 
- Denial of 
Access 





L60 Require foreigners taking 
citizenship test to 
demonstrate knowledge 











L53A Require foreigners 
born/raised in Denmark 
to apply for nationality 
- Denial of 
Access 





L54B Allow acquisition of 
Danish nationality by 
adult to extend to adult’s 
children 






2014-2015: Cabinet of Lokke-Rasmussen Cabinet (V).  
Ministry of Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations.  
Minister: Inger Stojberg (V) 
L2 Replacement of 
education aid and cash 
assistance for newly-
arrived foreigners with 
integration allowance 
- Denial of 
Access/Social 
Obligation 







2014-2015: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt Cabinet (S, RV). 
Ministry of Children, Equality, Integration and Social Relations.  
Minister: Manu Sareen (RV) 
L79 Reinstatement of 
previous more lenient 
rules for granting 
refugees access to state 
pensions 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL 




Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Mette Frederiksen (S) 
L99 Increase ability of 
government to revoke 
residence permits for 
foreigners who 
participate in armed 
conflict abroad 
- Revocation Confirmed V, DF, S, 
RV, SF, 
LA, KF 
EL, UFG / 
L72 Introduction of 
temporary protection 
status for individuals 
fleeing serious conflict in 
home country 






L44 Increase right of former 
citizens to regain 
citizenship; allow dual 
citizenship 
+ / Confirmed V, S, RV, 
SF, EL, 
LA, UFG 




2013-2014: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF). 
Ministry of Social Affairs, Children and Integration.  




assistance for foreigners 











Ease requirements of 
repatriation assistance so 




Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL 




Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S) 
L186 Increase right of children 
and young adults to have 
their residence cases 
reviewed 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, KF 
V, DF, LA / 
L162
A 
Allow children born to 
unwed Danes the same 
rights to citizenship as 
children born to married 
Danes 







Increase opportunities for 
non-citizens born and 
raised in Denmark to 
access citizenship 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, UFG 
V, DF, LA, 
KF 
/ 
L141 Abolition of guidelines 
for selecting refugees for 
quota system on basis of 
integration potential; 
introduction of system 
under which refugees are 
chosen based on their 
“needs and expectations” 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, UFG 




2012-2013: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).  
Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.  
Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S) 
L190 Obliges municipalities to 
provide refugees with 
individualized integration 
plans and health 
assessments 
+ / Confirmed S, RF, SF, 
EL, LA 




Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Morten Bodskov (S) 
L130 Increase right of asylum 
seekers to work and 
move outside of asylum 
center; extend offer of 
private residence to 
families with children 
after waiting period; 
increase incentives for 
rejected asylum seekers 








Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, LA 
V, DF, KF / 
L143 Increase right of 
authorities to revoke 
residence permits of 
individuals who have 












Increased right of 
trafficked individuals to 
temporary residence 
permits 






Increase right of abused 
spouses and children to 
stay in Denmark 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL 
V, DF, KF LA 
 
2011-2012: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt (S, RV, SF).  
Ministry for Social Affairs and Integration.  
Minister: Karen Haekkerup (S) 
L101 Abolish obligation of 
local governments to 
provide guidance on 
repatriation to foreigners; 
abolishes financial 
incentives for local 
governments to do so 
+/- / (Removal of 
Repatriation 
Incentive) 
Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, LA 




Ministry of Justice.  
Minister: Morten Bodskov (S) 
L180
A 
Allow refugees who have 
“shown willingness to 
integrate” access to 
permanent residence 
permits in shorter 
timeframes 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, LA 





Increase weight of 
Denmark’s international 
observations in 
considerations of when 
foreigners may be 
deported  
+ / Confirmed  S, RV, SF, 






L178 Provide foreigners the 
right to vote in municipal 
and regional elections 
after 3 years of residence 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, LA 
V, DF, KF / 
L150
A 
Increase obligation of 
authorities to foster 
integration of children 







ability to regain lost 
residence permits 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, LA 
V, DF, KF / 
L104 Allow spousal 
reunification for 
individuals with lower 
financial security than 
previous laws permitted; 
repeal of point system for 
spousal reunification 
+ / Confirmed S, RV, SF, 
EL, LA 
V, DF, KF / 
 
2010-2011: Cabinet of Helle Thorning-Schmidt.  
No laws made.  
 
2010-2011: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Soren Pind (V) 
L212 Compel foreign students 
to show more documents 
attesting to self-
sufficiency and language 
requirements 
- Denial of 
Access 
Confirmed V, DF, 
LA, CF 
S, SF, RV, 
EL 
/ 
L211 Oblige municipalities to 





Confirmed V, DF, 
KF, LA 
S, SF, RV, 
EL, KD 
/ 
L210 Oblige authorities to 
expel criminal foreigners 
unless doing so is 
expressly forbidden by 
Denmark’s international 
obligations 








L168 Tighten rules for spousal 
reunification 
- Denial of 
Access 
Confirmed V, DF, KF S, SF, RV, 
EL 
/ 
L66 Introduction of fees for 
family reunification and 
study applications  
- Financial 
Obligation 
Confirmed V, DF, 
KF, LA 
S, SF, RV, 
EL, UFG 
/ 
L37 Compel unaccompanied 
minors with residence 
permit to leave Denmark 
upon reaching age 18 
- Revocation Confirmed V, DF, 
KF, LA 




2009-2010: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V) 
L188 Increase number of 
crimes for which 
foreigners can be 
expelled; allow 
authorities to expel 
asylum seekers who go 
on vacation in home 
countries 
- Revocation  Confirmed V, DF, KF S, SF, RV, 
EL 
/ 
L87 Compel spouses seeking 
reunification in Denmark 
to take immigration test  
- Social 
Obligation 
Confirmed V, S, DF, 
SF, KF, 
UFG 
RV, EL / 
L187 Introduction of 
compulsory course in 
Danish society and 
culture for residence 
permit-seekers; increase 
in waiting period for 
third-country nationals to 







Confirmed V, S, DF, 
SF, KF 
RV, EL / 
L81 Encourages repatriation 









L64 Allow foreign workers to 
access labor-related 
education before access 
to Danish education is 
gained 




S, SF, RV 
 
2008-2009: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, SF).  
Ministry of Refuges, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V) 
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L174 Increase length of some 
entry bans; expand range 
of circumstances under 
which foreigners may be 
expelled 









L69 Require foreigners in 
Denmark on temporary 
stay conditions to report 
to police daily 
- Denial of 
Access 





2007-2008: Cabinet of Lars Lokke Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Birthe Ronn Hornbech (V) 
L132 Ease conditions under 
which skilled foreign 
workers may move to 
and work in Denmark 
+ / Confirmed V, DF, 
KF, RV, 
NY 
S, SF  EL 
L131 Increase authors’ access 
to residence permits 
+ / Confirmed V, DF, 
KF, RV, 
NY, S, SF 
/ / 
  
2006-2007: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Rikke Hvilshoj (V) 
L218 Conference of financial 
support in home country 




Confirmed V, DF, KF S, RV, SF, 
EL 
/ 
L198 Increase in waiting 
periods for persons found 
to have abused the au 
pair scheme 
- Denial of 
Access 





L93 Introduction of 
integration test as 
requirement for cash 
assistance and some 
residence permits; 
introduction of 










2005-2006: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Carstens 34 
 
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Rikke Hvilshoj (V) 
L235 Ease conditions under 
which Eastern Europeans 
can work in Denmark, in 
expectation of Eastern 
states’ accession to the 
EU  
+ / Confirmed V, S, KF, 
RV, SF 
DF, EL / 
L180 Include within 
citizenship test questions 
about Danish society, 
history and culture 
- Social 
Obligation 
Confirmed V, DF, KF S, RV, SF, 
EL 
/ 
L128 Creation of “conditional 
expulsion” to make it 
easier to expel foreigners 
convicted of a crime in 
event that they commit 
further crimes 
- Revocation  Confirmed V, S, DF, 
KF 
RV, SF, EL / 
L94 Increased penalties for 
parents who send their 
children on “restoration 
trips” to home country at 
expense of child’s 
education and integration 
- Denial of 
Access 




L93 Introduction of 
integration contract that 
must be signed by 
foreigner with residence 
permit and municipality 
issuing that permit 
- Social 
Obligation 
Confirmed V, DF, KF RV, SF, EL  S 
 
2004-2005: Cabinet of Anders Fogh Rasmussen (V, KF).  
Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration.  
Minister: Bertel Haarder (V) 
L163 Effectively confers 
citizenship upon 3038 
persons and implies that 
2064 children may 
acquire citizenship 




L79A Increase requirement of 
refugees in Denmark to 
partake of Danish 




Confirmed V, S, DF, 
KF 
RV, SF, EL / 
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L79B Provide for selection of 
refugees under quota 
system on basis of 




Confirmed V, S, DF, 
KF 
RV, SF, EL / 
L78 Increase penalties for 
foreigners working 
illegally; increased 
penalties for persons 
found to be facilitating 
illegal work 
- Denial of 
Access 
Confirmed V, S, DF, 
KF 
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